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1. INTRODUCTION
Entry is of central importance to competition and market performance. While it has long
been known that free entry is e¢ cient under perfect competition, economists have more
recently recognized that the impact of unencumbered entry on total welfare is ambiguous
when rms possess market power, due to consumersgain and competitors loss that the
entrant does not internalize (e.g., Von Weizsacker, 1980; Mankiw and Whinston, 1986;
and Cabral, 2004). The standard view in economics, however, is still that more entry will
boost consumer welfare. In homogeneous-product markets, industry output under Cournot
competition generally expands with entry (e.g., Seade, 1980).1 Even in markets with dif-
ferentiated products, where it has been argued that price-increasing entry is theoretically
unexceptional, the consumer gain from greater product variety will usually dominate any
potential adverse price e¤ect (e.g., Chen and Riordan, 2008).
This paper conducts a new analysis of entry and welfare in an important class of markets
those with consumer search, focusing especially on how entry a¤ects consumer welfare,
measured by aggregate consumer surplus. Our interest in search markets is partly motivated
by the reection that, despite the substantial progress in the economics of search,2 little
attention has been paid to the e¤ects of changes in entry conditions, and yet technological
progress such as the Internet has drastically reduced entry costs in many search markets.
We focus on consumer welfare because, as we shall demonstrate, the common belief that
unfettered entry benets consumers is actually misguided. This will have ramications for
business practices as well as for antitrust and regulation policies.
We consider a model where potential entrants di¤er in quality the probability that a
sellers product will match a consumers need. This probability is larger for a high quality
1Amir and Lambson (2000) demonstrate that price can increase in the number of rms under Cournot
competition. Nevertheless, as the authors point out, the assumptions needed for such an outcome, which
involves an unstable equilibrium in a certain sense, are restrictive.
2Starting from the seminal work of Stigler (1961), the literature has advanced in the directions of search
for the best price among competing homogeneous sellers (e.g., Stahl, 1989) and of search for the best value
among competing di¤erentiated sellers (e.g., Wolinsky, 1986).
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rm, whose product thus has a high expected value to consumers. Each rm privately learns
its quality, and can choose to enter the market by incurring an entry cost. After rms si-
multaneously make their entry decisions, those who have entered the market simultaneously
choose prices, whereas each consumer, observing the number of rms in the market, can
conduct sequential search to nd out the price and product value of one or more sellers. A
consumer receives zero utility from a non-matched product, while her utility from a matched
product is a random draw from a known distribution and is identical for all her matches.3
The model is thus a dynamic game of incomplete information, and the type-contingent na-
ture of the entry decision makes the model di¤erent from an otherwise standard two-stage
entry game (e.g., Mankiw and Whinston, 1986).
Under certain conditions and for a given entry cost, the model has a unique symmetric
(perfect Bayesian) equilibrium, where every potential entrant will choose to enter the market
if and only if its quality exceeds some threshold, and, similarly as in Diamond (1971), the
equilibrium price is invariant with respect to the number of sellers.4 We are interested in
two related welfare questions at this equilibrium. First, given an entry cost, how will the
expected number of entrants under free entry compare to those that maximize consumer or
total welfare? Second, how will an exogenous change in entry conditions, such as the entry
cost, a¤ect welfare in the free entry equilibrium?
We nd that, holding everything else constant, free entry leads to an excessive number
of rms for consumer welfare, and hence also for total welfare,5 when entry cost is below
some critical value; whereas entry is decient for consumer welfare when entry cost is above
this critical value. More strikingly, we nd that consumer welfare is an inverted-U function
3This formulation follows several recent papers on consumer search (e.g., Athey and Ellison, 2011; Chen
and He, 2011; and Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011).
4 In search markets, more sellers can cause price to rise (e.g., Satterthwaite, 1979; Stahl, 1989), to fall
(e.g., Wolinsky, 1986), or to either increase, decrease, or unchange (Janssen and Moraga-González, 2004).
Our model provides a useful baseline case, making it transparent that the mechanism through which entry
a¤ects consumer welfare in our setting di¤ers from the usual price e¤ect.
5Since entry also has the business-stealing e¤ect (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986), if it is excessive for
consumer welfare, it must also be for total welfare.
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of entry cost, rst increasing and then decreasing, maximized at the critical entry cost: We
obtain these results in our model by rst identifying two externalities of entry on consumer
search, which we term as the search variety and search quality e¤ects: The entry of a rm
expands the search options available to each consumer, which is the positive search variety
e¤ect that the entrant does not internalize. But a marginal entrant also lowers search
quality, because it reduces the expected quality of sellers in the market and makes a search
less likely to produce a match. This negative search quality e¤ect is also not internalized
by an entrant.6
The existence of the search variety and quality e¤ects of entry suggests that free entry
may not maximize consumer welfare. But this by itself does not tell us whether on balance
entry will be too much or too little for consumers. While the analysis to establish our
consumer welfare results is rather involved, the intuition behind it is simple. When entry
cost is low, the expected number of entrants is large while the marginal entrants quality
is much below the average quality. Hence, the positive search variety e¤ect of entry is
small but the negative search quality e¤ect is large. Consequently, free entry, under which
an entrant does not internalize these two externalities, is excessive for consumer welfare.
Moreover, for a small increase in the entry cost; the increase in search quality is signicant
but the decrease in search variety is not, and thus consumer welfare rises. Conversely, when
entry cost is high, the positive variety e¤ect is substantial but the negative quality e¤ect is
negligible, so that free entry is decient for consumers, and a marginal reduction in entry
cost will increase consumer welfare. Remarkably, in our model the trade o¤ between these
two e¤ects of entry varies smoothly so that consumer welfare is a single peaked function of
entry cost.7
Our result on how entry a¤ects consumer welfare, while unconventional, is quite natural
6More generally, entry can also a¤ect consumer welfare through a price e¤ect. We will study a variant of
our model, where the price e¤ect is present, to check the robustness of our welfare results.
7 In the literature on information congestion in two-sided markets (e.g., Anderson and de Palma, 2009),
externalities created by both information senders and receivers can also lead to decient or excessive entries.
By analyzing a di¤erent trade-o¤ in a novel model, we o¤er new insights on how entry a¤ects consumer
welfare and total welfare in search markets.
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for search markets. In fact, we can interpret search markets very broadly, to include any
market where rms have private information about product quality and consumers can
obtain costly quality information before purchase. Consider, for example, Akerlof (1970)s
classic model of used-car market, where, under adverse selection, low quality sellers drive
out high quality sellers, and the market may shut down completely. One may view our paper
as taking Akerlofs model a step further by adding consumer search to it, so that a buyer
can incur a search (inspection) cost to nd out, possibly with the help of an auto mechanic,
whether a car has a defect.8 A high quality seller, whose car is less likely to be defective,
then has a higher probability to succeed in trading, and hence more incentive to incur the
(entry) cost to list its car for sale. The buyersability to detect a cars aw through costly
search may thus mitigate the adverse selection problem.9 But if entry cost is very low, it
will not prevent low quality sellers from entering the market; buyerssearch e¢ ciency will
then be too low and the market is likely to perform poorly. On the other hand, if entry cost
is too high, very few sellers will enter the market, and even if their expected quality is high,
it will be hard for buyers with heterogeneous preferences to nd a match under the very
limited search opportunities. This, in essence, is the trade o¤ between the search variety
and search quality e¤ects of entry, as our analysis uncovers.10
In search markets, therefore, it will not be unusual for entry restrictions to benet con-
sumers. This can shed light on many business practices. Consider, for instance, the market
of apps for iPhones and iPads. Apple clearly has the incentive to increase consumer surplus
in this market, which would boost its prots from the sale of iPhones and iPads. Whereas
8This, together with the consumers idiosyncratic taste, may then determine whether the car will meet
her need.
9There are related studies of search and product quality in the literature. For example, in Wolinsky
(1983), prices are observable before consumer search and may serve as signals of product quality that is
privately known by rms. Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) consider a search model where consumers can
imperfectly observe prices and qualities after incurring search costs. They nd that an improvement of price
or quality information may either increase or decrease welfare.
10 Importantly, the search quality e¤ect arises only because asymmetric information on product quality: if
consumers had perfect quality information, the entry of more rms, even of those with low qualities, would
not reduce search e¢ ciency, because consumers could always choose to search high quality sellers rst.
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more entrants of app developers will o¤er users more choices, the entry of low quality sellers
can reduce search quality and make it harder for consumers to nd a desired app. Apple
appears to balance this trade o¤ by both increasing entry cost and maintaining a minimum
quality standard: it charges a xed fee to each entrant ($99/year), and the entrants product
has to go through a stringent review process. Only products that are approved by Apple
can be o¤ered for sale to consumers. In addition to entry barriers created by private entities
(as we shall discuss further in the concluding section), government policies can also limit
entry, as for example, with a minimum quality requirement. A license fee that acts as a
transfer payment can also positively impact both consumer and total welfare by raising the
quality of the marginal entrant. On the other hand, an entry barrier that adds to physical
cost of entry (such as transaction cost) might benet consumers but reduce total welfare.
We describe our model in Section 2, and characterize its equilibrium in Section 3. In
Section 4, we establish our main results on how the free entry outcomes compare with those
that maximize consumer or total welfare, and how welfare may vary with entry conditions.
In Section 5, we analyze a variant of the main model, in which a consumers value for each
match is an independent random draw, and hence the matched sellers of any consumer
are horizontally di¤erentiated. Entry then also has a price e¤ect, which complicates the
analysis; nevertheless, in the numerical examples that we consider the welfare results of our
main model continue to hold.11 In addition to serving as a robustness check, this section also
contains a result of independent interest: we nd that equilibrium market price decreases
in the expected quality of sellers in the market. Section 6 o¤ers concluding remarks. Proofs
that are more technical in nature are relegated to the appendix.
11This variant of our model is closely related to Anderson and Renault (1999), who study a standard con-
sumer search model with horizontally di¤erentiated products and nd that market entry is always excessive
for total welfare. We shall explain in section 5 why the presence of vertical di¤erentiation leads to very
di¤erent results and new insights.
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2. THE MODEL
The market contains a unit mass of consumers, each demanding one unit of a product.
There are N  2 potential entrants who can choose to become active sellers, and the
entry cost for each seller is k > 0: Each consumer is ex ante uncertain about whether a
particular rm o¤ers a product that she desires and how much she is willing to pay for such
a product. Specically, with probability i; potential entrant is product, i = 1; 2; :::N;
meets a consumers need. The consumer derives utility u from consuming the product of
all her matched sellers; and u is an independent draw from distribution F with density f
on support [u; u] ; where u > u  0:12 With probability 1   i; is product does not meet
the consumers need, in which case the consumer utility from the product is normalized to
zero.13 Thus, we consider i as a measure of i
0s quality.14 Potential sellers di¤er in their
quality. In particular, we assume that i draws from cumulative distribution function G
with density function g > 0 on support [0; 1] : Finally, the production cost of each seller is
normalized to zero.15
The timing of the model is as follows. First, i is realized and is known privately by
i: Second, potential entrants simultaneously choose either to enter the market or to stay
out. Third, the market structure is determined, with n entrants as sellers. Consumers are
informed of the number of sellers. Although n = 0 is always a possibility, our analysis will
12Note that i is rm-specic, but its realization is consumer-specic (in the sense that a match for
one consumer does not necessarily imply a match for another). Also, u is consumer-specic, but for each
consumer, it is equal across her matched sellers.
13For example, a consumer may have a specic requirement for a product, such as a certain quality feature
for a car, and a high-quality seller is more likely to meet the requirement. Or, a consumer may need to
improve a products performance (such as the energy e¢ ciency of a house), and a high-quality rm is more
likely to nd the right solution to the problem. It could also be that the consumers are input purchasers
on an intermediate-good market, and a high-quality supplier is more likely to meet each buyers quality
standard.
14 In fact, the expected value of seller i0s product to a consumer is simply i
R u
u
udF (u) ; which increases
in i: Thus, a high-quality seller is more likely to o¤er consumers a high-value product.
15More precisely, the marginal cost of production is equal to the consumer utility from a non-matched
product, which has been assumed to be zero.
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focus on situations where n  1; and we assume that k is relatively small so that a potential
entrant with a su¢ ciently high i will enter the market: Fourth, sellers simultaneously and
independently set their prices, after which each consumer, without knowing whether any
particular seller is a match, her value u for the match; and the sellers price, chooses whether
and how to conduct sequential search. Each search will enable the consumer to discover the
aforementioned information from a seller, with search cost s. We study symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of this game.
Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption that 1   F (u) and 1   G () are
log-concave. Let
pm = arg max
p
fp [1  F (p)]g ; m = pm [1  F (pm)] :
Then, pm exists uniquely and is interior, due to the log-concavity of 1 F: The logconcavity
of 1   G will be used in Lemma 1 to show that the equilibrium prot of an entrant is
increasing in its quality type.
3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Suppose for a moment that, given k; a potential entrant will enter the market if and only
if its quality exceeds some threshold t:We rst study equilibrium for any given threshold t:
We then show that in equilibrium the expected prot of potential entrant i indeed increases
in i; thereby conrming the optimality of the threshold-based entry strategy for each
potential entrant. The equilibrium threshold tf is then determined, which is shown to
increase in k.
For any given t; the expected quality of an entrant is
   (t) =
R 1
t xg (x) dx
1 G (t) ; (1)
where  > t for all t 2 [0; 1) since R 1t xg (x) dx > t [1 G (t)] :
First, consider the sellersprice strategy and consumerssearch strategy. If there is only
one seller (n = 1), its equilibrium price will be pm; and consumers will search if

Z u
pm
(u  pm) f (u) du  s  0: (2)
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Condition (2) is satised if s is not too large, which we assume throughout the paper.
With n  2 sellers, from standard arguments (e.g., Diamond, 1971; Chen and He, 2011),
there is a unique equilibrium where each seller sets p = pm; each consumer will search
sequentially and will purchase from the rst match, provided that u  pm: The consumer
will exit the market without purchase if u < pm or if she has searched all n sellers without
nding a match.
Thus, in equilibrium, seller i0s expected prot for any given t when there are n entrants
in the market (including i) is
n (i) = i
mn; (3)
where
n =
1
n
n 1X
j=0
(1  )j = 1  (1  )
n
n
(4)
is the expected number of consumers who visit seller i when n rms (n  1 rivals) enter the
market.
We next determine the endogenous number of sellers: Consider a potential sellers entry
decision. From (3), a sellers expected prot, when there are n entrants, is increasing in
i: To determine the equilibrium t; we consider the decision of i with i: The post-entry
expected prot for i is
E (ji) =
NX
n=1
n (t)n (i) ; (5)
where
n (t) =

N 1
n 1

[1 G (t)]n 1G (t)N n (6)
is the probability that n 1 other potential entrants enter and n (i) is the expected prot
for i if it chooses entry simultaneously as the n  1 others. Our analysis will utilize Lemma
1 below, which states that (i) an increase in the marginal entrants quality will raise the
average quality of all entrants in the market, but (ii) the marginal increases relatively more
than the average. Part (i) is straightforward, and while (ii) is also intuitive, it relies on the
log-concavity of 1 G.
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Lemma 1 For all t 2 [0; 1):
(i)
d
dt
=
g (t)
1 G (t) (   t) > 0; (ii)
d (t= (t))
dt
=
   g(t)t( t)1 G(t)
2
> 0: (7)
By Lemma 1, the proof of which is contained in the Appendix,
n (t) = 
m t

1  (1  )n
n
(8)
increases in t: That is, given n; the expected prot for the marginal entrant is higher if it has
a higher quality. It can also be veried that n (t) decreases in n: Lemma 2, which is also
proved in the Appendix, establishes that the expected post-entry prot for the marginal
entrant is increasing in its quality:
Lemma 2 E (jt) increases in t:
Notice that the marginal entrant will earn zero if it has i = 0; and will earn 
m if it has
i = 1: Therefore, for any given k 2 [0; m), there exists a unique threshold tf  tf (k) 2
[0; 1) that satises
E (jtf ) = k; (9)
and tf = tf (k) increases in k; with tf = 0 for k = 0 and tf ! 1 as k ! m. We have
thus shown that there exists a symmetric equilibrium where each potential entrant will
enter if and only if its quality reaches the threshold tf ; and tf monotonically increases in k:
Moreover, it is straightforward to check that there can be no other symmetric equilibrium.
Summarizing the above discussion, we have:
Proposition 1 For any given k 2 (0; m) ; there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium
where: (i) potential entrant i; i = 1; 2; :::; N; will enter the market if and only if i  tf ,
with tf 2 (0; 1) ; dened in (9), being an increasing function of k, and each seller will charge
price pm; (ii) each consumer will search sequentially in random order, purchase from the
rst match if u  pm; and make no purchase if either she nds no match or u < pm:
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4. WELFARE ANALYSIS
In our model, the number of entrants (n) is uncertain, depending on the number of
potential entrants (N); the realizations of i; and entry cost (k): Hence a proper measure of
entry is the expected number of entrants, which is determined by t; the minimum possible
quality of actual entrants: A lower t corresponds to a higher expected number of sellers in the
market. In equilibrium, through the dependence of tf on k; the expected number of sellers
in turn will be determined by k. We can then compare it with the number that maximizes
consumer or total welfare, and explore how welfare may vary with entry conditions.
4.1 Consumer Welfare
For a given t; consumer welfare, measured by expected aggregate consumer surplus (net
of search cost), is
V =
NX
n=1
n (t)Vn (; p
m) ; (10)
where
n (t) =
 
N
n

[1 G (t)]nG (t)N n (11)
is the probability that exactly n sellers have entered, and
Vn (; p
m) =
nX
i=1
(1  )i 1 
Z u
pm
(u  pm) f (u) du 
nX
i=1
(1  )i 1 is  (1  )n ns (12)
is the consumer welfare with n  1 sellers when their expected quality is . In Vn above,
the rst term is the (weighted) sum of benet when a consumer has searched and purchased
from the ith seller, while the second and the third terms are the expected search cost when
the consumer ends up with and without purchase, respectively. We dene:
 =
Z u
pm
(u  pm) f (u) du; M (t) = 1   [1 G (t)] ; (13)
where  is a consumers expected surplus from a match, andM (t) indicates the probability
that a potential entrant will not be a match when the entry threshold is t.
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Lemma 3 Consumer welfare V  V (t) can be expressed as:
V =
h
1 M (t)N
i
  s


: (14)
Equation (14) has an intuitive interpretation. The probability that a consumer will
(eventually) nd a match is 1  M (t)N . Since  is the expected surplus to a consumer
from a match and s= is the search cost adjusted by the expected match probability per
seller,    s reects the expected net benet from a search that yields a match. With a
unit mass of consumers, consumer welfare is the consumers expected net benet from the
entry of rms under threshold t.
Notice that given the distribution of u; search cost s; and the number of potential entrants
N; V is entirely determined by t through  =  (t) and M (t) : Totally di¤erentiating (14)
with respect to t; we have
dV
dt
=  NM (t)N 1 dM
dt

  s


| {z }
search variety e¤ect
+
h
1 M (t)N
i s
2
d
dt| {z }
search quality e¤ect
: (15)
Thus, the impact of increased entry (i.e., a decrease in t) on consumer welfare can be
decomposed into two parts: a search variety e¤ect and a search quality e¤ect. The rst
term in (15), the variety e¤ect, is the change in V due to dM=dt: a decrease in t raises
the expected number of entrants, providing consumers with more search opportunities to
obtain the expected net benet

  s

. From (13) and by Lemma 1,
dM (t)
dt
=  d
dt
[1 G (t)] + g (t) = g (t) t > 0: (16)
The second term, the quality e¤ect, is the change in V due to d=dt: Noticing from (7)
d
dt
=
g (t) (   t)
1 G (t) > 0; (17)
and hence more entry has a negative quality e¤ect: a decrease in t reduces the average
match probability of sellers in the market, lowering consumer search e¢ ciency. The change
in consumer welfare from a marginal entrant depends on the balance of these two opposing
e¤ects. Since tf (k) is monotonically increasing, a reduction in k has the same two e¤ects
as a reduction in tf in equilibrium:
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Dene Vf  V (tf ) as the consumer welfare in the free-entry equilibrium. We can now
state our main result concerning free entry and consumer welfare. Its proof rst establishes
that V (t) is single-peaked, and then uses the fact that tf monotonically increases in k.
Theorem 1 There exists some k 2 (0; m) such that, relative to what maximizes consumer
welfare, the expected number of entrants under free entry is too high when k < k and too low
when k > k: Furthermore, consumer welfare is an inverted-U function of k; rst increasing
and then decreasing, maximized at k:
Proof. From (15), utilizing (16) and (17); and noticing 11 G(t) =

1 M(t) ; we have
dV
dt
=
h
1 M (t)N
i s
2

g (t)
1 G (t) (   t) NM (t)
N 1 g (t) t

  s


= g (t)
"
1 M (t)N
1 M (t)
s

(   t) NM (t)N 1 t

  s

#
: (18)
Therefore, for t 2 (0; 1) ; dVdt = 0 if
t

=
1
1 +NM (t)N 1 1 M(t)
1 M(t)N

 s
s
 : (19)
If t = 0; the LHS of (19) < the RHS of (19); if t! 1, the LHS of (19) > the RHS of (19).
Furthermore, from Lemma 1, the LHS of (19) monotonically increases in t: Since dM(t)dt  0;
d
dt  0; and
d

MN 1 1 M
1 MN

dM
=
MN 2
(1 MN )2
 
N  NM +MN   1 = MN 2 (1 M)
(1 MN )2
0@N   N 1X
j=0
M j
1A  0;
the RHS of (19) decreases in t. Therefore, there exists a unique t 2 (0; 1) that solves
(19), with dVdt > 0 if t < t
 and dVdt < 0 if t > t
. Furthermore, since tf = t (k) is
monotonically increasing and dVfdk =
dVf
dtf
t0f (k) ; Vf rst increases and then decreases in k;
maximized at some k 2 (0; m). Finally, since the entry threshold associated with the
maximum consumer welfare is t = tf (k) ; relative to what maximizes consumer welfare,
free entry is excessive when k < k but decient when k > k.
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As t; or entry cost k, decreases, more potential entrants choose to enter the market, but
the marginal entrant has a lower quality. When k is high, entry is decient and a decrease
in k benets consumers, both because the opportunity to search an additional entrant is
highly valuable when the expected number of entrants is small and because the margin
entrant has a relatively high quality, so that the positive variety e¤ect dominates.16 When
k is relatively low, entry is excessive and an increase in k benets consumers, because in
this case the negative quality e¤ect of entry dominates.17
We note that search cost is crucial for our consumer welfare results in Theorem 1. As
search cost approaches zero, from (15) the search quality e¤ect vanishes so that dV=dt < 0;
consequently both t and k approach 0, and more entrants will (almost) always benet
consumers because of the positive variety e¤ect. Then, free entry will (almost) always be de-
cient from consumersperspective, and our novel result, that there is too much equilibrium
entry for consumers in search markets when entry cost is small, becomes irrelevant.18
The result below shows more generally how search cost and the number of potential
entrants a¤ect k; the entry cost that maximizes consumer welfare.
Corollary 1 k; or t; increases in search cost (s) and in the number of potential entrants
(N).
Proof. Since t = t (k) ; it su¢ ces to show that t increases in s and in N: Since LHS
of (19) increases in t and is independent of s while RHS decreases in t and increases in s,
t increases in s: Moreover, since M < 1; d

N lnM  MN + 1 =dM = NM  NMN 1 > 0;
16When t ! 1; t and  are close. So the rst term in the square bracket of (18) approaches zero, while
the second term is positive and increasing in t: Hence dV=dt < 0 when t is high.
17When t ! 0; the rst term in the square bracket of (18) approaches some positive constant, while the
second term approaches zero: Hence dV=dt > 0 when t is low.
18Our analysis for Theorem 1 remains valid for arbitrarily small s; as long as it is strictly positive. If
s = 0; there would be no pure-strategy price equilibrium, because rms would want to undercut each other
to compete for consumers with multiple matches, but also to raise price to consumers with only one match.
The analysis would then be very di¤erent from ours. Thus, again, costly search plays a crucial role in our
model.
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and N ln 1  1N + 1 = 0; we have
d

NMN 1
1 M
1 MN

=dN =
MN 1
(1 MN )2 (1 M)
 
N lnM  MN + 1 < 0:
Therefore, t increases in N .
The entry cost (or the quality threshold) that maximizes consumer welfare increases in
search cost and in the number of potential entrants. Intuitively, with a high search cost, it is
more costly for consumers to search more varieties. It follows that fewer sellers with higher
quality tend to be better for consumers, and hence k (or t) is higher. Also, when the
number of potential sellers is high, the variety e¤ect is less signicant because for a given
k the expected number of entrants is large, and hence an increase in t tends to be more
benecial to consumers. Therefore, t also increases in the number of potential entrants.
4.2 Total Welfare
We next consider total welfare. For given k and t; the (expected) industry prot is
 =
NX
n=0
n (t)n [n ()  k] ; (20)
where n ()  k is the expected prot for a seller of quality  in a market with n sellers:19
The result below is proved in the appendix:
Lemma 4 For any given t; industry prot is
 (t) = m
h
1 M (t)N
i
  kN [1 G (t)] ; (21)
and the free-entry equilibrium industry prot is
f =

1  tf

h
1 M (tf )N
i
m: (22)
Notice that
h
1 M (tf )N
i
m is the expected industry revenue when at least one sellers
product matches a consumers need. Since the marginal entrant with tf earns zero prot,
1  tf reects the expected prot margin of each entrant.
19Note that in our model, in the free entry equilibrium only the marginal entrant earns zero prot, while
the other entrants earn positive prots.
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From (14) and (22), total welfare at the free entry equilibrium is
Wf =
h
1 M (tf )N
i 
  s


+

1  tf


m

: (23)
Proposition 2 In equilibrium: (i) industry prot decreases in k; (ii) total welfare decreases
in k when s is su¢ ciently small or k is su¢ ciently high:
Proof. From (22) and (23), since k a¤ects f and Wf only through tf ; and since tf
increases in k; it su¢ ces to show that the stated relationships for k hold for tf : (i) Recall
from (7) and (16) that d(t=)dt > 0 and
dM
dt  0: Thus
df
dtf
< 0: (ii) From Proposition 1,
consumer welfare decreases in t when t is high. Thus, since dfdtf < 0; Wf = Vf + f must
decrease in tf when tf is su¢ ciently high. Furthermore,
dWf
dtf
=  NM (tf )N 1 g (tf ) tf

  s


+

1  tf


m

+
h
1 M (tf )N
i  s
2
d
dtf
  d (tf=)
dtf
m

:
Recall that
d(tf=)
dtf
> 0: Hence, dWfdtf < 0 if s! 0:
A marginal increase in entry cost raises tf ; which reduces the expected number of sellers,
and, hence, the probability of sales. Additionally, a higher entry cost reduces an inframar-
ginal sellers prot margin. Consequently, industry prot is reduced with a higher entry
cost. On total welfare, a higher k will increase consumer welfare by raising tf when k < k;
which can potentially outweigh the prot e¤ect. But when k is large, prot and consumer
welfare move in the same direction, and henceW is lower with an even higher k: Also, when
s is small, the low search cost can largely o¤set the reduction in sellersquality to provide
search incentives, so that the prot change will dominate and hence an increase in entry
cost will lower total welfare.
Example 1 below illustrates how the equilibrium consumer welfare, industry prot and
total welfare vary with entry cost k:
Example 1 Suppose that N = 3; s = 0:05; with i and u being uniformly distributed on
[0; 1] : Then, from (1) and (13),  = 1+t2 , M =
1+t2
2 ;  =
1
8 and 
m = 14 : From (5), tf solves
15
E (jt) = 148 t
 
4t2 + t4 + 7

= k: From (14), Vf = 1320 (5tf + 1) (1  tf )

4t2f + t
4
f + 7

; t =
0:497; and k = 0:083: Moreover, from (22), f = 132 (1  tf )2

4t2f + t
4
f + 7

; and thus
Wf =
1
320 (11  5tf ) (1  tf )

4t2f + t
4
f + 7

: In Figure 1, consumer welfare is the inverted-
U curve, while both industry prot and total welfare decrease with k:
Consumer welfare - solid curve, Industry prot - dashed curve, Total welfare - dotted curve
0.0 0.1 0.2
0.0
0.1
0.2
k
welfare
Figure 1
Now consider the socially optimal t; denoted as to  to (k) ; for which we do not impose
the free-entry condition E (jt) = k: From (21) and (14), for any given t; total welfare is
given by
W (t) =

  s

+ m
h
1 M (t)N
i
  kN [1 G (t)] : (24)
Thus,
dW
dt
=
s
2
d
dt
h
1 M (t)N
i
 

  s

+ m

NM (t)N 1 tg (t) + kNg (t) : (25)
At the free entry equilibrium, since the marginal entrant has zero net prot due to
E (jtf ) = k; the marginal entrant must reduce industry prot due to the business-stealing
e¤ect. From Proposition 1, for tf < t  tf (k) ; free entry is excessive for consumer welfare.
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Therefore, when k  k (or tf  t); free entry must be socially excessive, with to > tf .
When k > k; entry is decient for consumer welfare, but it can still be socially excessive
when the negative prot e¤ect is considered. However, when k is large, the prot e¤ect is
small relative to the e¤ect on consumers, and entry is socially decient, as we establish in
the result below.
Proposition 3 Free entry is socially excessive (i.e., to > tf ) when k  k; and it is socially
decient (i.e., to < tf ) when k is su¢ ciently large (but still smaller than m):
Proof. We have already argued to > tf when k  k: It remains to show to < tf when
k (< m) is su¢ ciently large. From the proof of Lemma 4, any t  tf satises k 
t

m
h
1 M(t)N
N [1 G(t)]
i
: Substituting this into (25), we have
dW
dt

ttf

"
1 M (t)N
1 G (t)

s (   t)
2
+
t

m

 

  s

+ m

NM (t)N 1 t
#
g (t) :
Thus, when k ! m; t ! 1;  ! 1;M (t) ! 1 and, from (16), limt!1 1 M(t)
N
1 G(t) =
limt!1
 N M(t)N 1g(t)t
 g(t) = N: Hence, the right-hand side of the above inequality approaches
  (  s)Ng (1) < 0:
Therefore, when k is su¢ ciently large (but still smaller than m); dWdt

ttf < 0; so that free
entry is socially decient (i.e., to < tf ).
As in the case of consumer welfare, search cost also plays an important role for our total
welfare results. As s ! 0 and hence k ! 0; the result in Proposition 3 that free entry is
excessive for total welfare when k  k, while still valid, is virtually irrelevant. More entry
will then increase consumer welfare due to the search variety e¤ect but reduce industry
prot due to business stealing, with the net impact on total welfare potentially ambiguous.
When k (< m) is su¢ ciently high, however, Proposition 3 applies and the equilibrium
number of entrants will be too small relative to the social optimum.
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5. DIFFERENTIATION AMONG MATCHED SELLERS
So far, we have assumed that a consumer has the same value (u) from all of her matched
sellers, even though u is ex ante uncertain to the consumer. As we mentioned earlier, one
advantage of this formulation is that equilibrium price will then be invariant to the number
of sellers, which substantially simplies the analysis. We now consider an alternative setting
where a consumer has heterogeneous values for sellers who match her need. Specically,
as in Wolinsky (1986), we assume that a consumers value for each matched seller i, ui; is
independently drawn from distribution F on support [0; u] ; with density f:20 Thus, there
is horizontal di¤erentiation among matched sellers.21 Everything else is the same as in the
main model.
A key aspect in which this variant di¤ers from the main model is that entry will now also
a¤ect market price. Our analysis in this section proceeds as follows: First, we characterize
the equilibrium pricing strategy given the number of active sellers (n) and their average
quality (). Next, we show that the equilibrium market price (pn) decreases in . This
additional price e¤ect introduces a complication to the expected prot for a seller. In
particular, unlike in the main model, it is no longer clear that a potential entrants expected
prot will increase in t, because a higher t, which results in a higher average quality ; now
also leads to a lower equilibrium price. After presenting the equilibrium analysis for a given
n, we will turn to numerical analysis to show that the welfare results of the main model
still hold under additional functional and parameter conditions.
Suppose rst that there are n  N sellers in the market who all set price pn.22 Following
20That is, in contrast to our main model in which the values of a consumers matched sellers are perfectly
dependent, this formulation considers the other polar case where these values are independent. More realis-
tically, the values of a consumers matched sellers may be neither perfectly dependent nor independent; but,
like others in the literature, we focus on these two polar cases for analytical tractability.
21Search models with horizontally di¤erentiated sellers following Wolinsky (1986) include, for example,
Anderson and Renault (1999), Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009), Haan and Moraga-González (2011),
and Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat (2012).
22Even though sellers di¤er in match probabilities, a seller is either a match or no match after the search
by a consumer, and the seller competes in prices only with other matched sellers for the consumer. Since
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Kohn and Shavell (1974) and Wolinsky (1986), consumers optimal search strategy is to
sample sellers sequentially, with reservation value a () from matched seller i that satises

Z u
a
(ui   a) f (ui) dui = s: (26)
Note that the market is active only when sellers are expected to charge pn  a: A consumer
stops searching when she nds a match with ui  a; if no such product is found after
she searches all sellers, she buys the product from the matched seller with the highest
ui  pn; and she buys nothing if no match is found or if ui < pn for all matches. Since ui
is independently and identically distributed for each of a consumers matched sellers, for
convenience we shall drop the subscript i for the rest of the section.
Total di¤erentiation of (26) with respect to  and rearranging terms, we have
@a
@
=
R u
a (u  a) f (u) du

R u
a f (u) du
=
s
2 [1  F (a)] > 0: (27)
Hence, a increases with . That is, the benet of search is larger if the expected quality
of sellers is higher. We assume that s is su¢ ciently small such that consumers will indeed
search in equilibrium.
Next, we characterize the condition for the equilibrium where sellers charge the same
price despite di¤erences in match probabilities.23 If there is only one seller (n = 1); then it
optimally charges p1 = pm: So suppose that n  2. If other sellers charge pn in equilibrium,
given the search strategy by consumers, a seller with i charges p to maximize
ni (p; pn) = p fi [1  F (p+ a  pn)]'n + iRn (p; pn)g ; (28)
where
'n =
1
n
n 1X
j=0
jX
h=0

j
h

(1  )h [F (a)]j h = 1  [1   + F (a)]
n
n [1  F (a)] (29)
all matched sellers of a consumer are horizontally di¤erentiated and are ex ante identical to the consumer,
it is appropriate to consider a symmetric price equilibrium. Alternatively, one may consider a possible
asymmetric price equilibrium where rms with higher match probabilities change higher prices, but it does
not appear to be analytically tractable in the model here.
23 Intuitively, all matched sellers of a consumer are horizontally di¤erentiated as in Wolinsky (1986), and
thus the equilibrium has a similar structure.
19
is the number of consumers who come to seller i for the rst time after sampling j 2
f0; 1; :::; n  1g other sellers and nding no match or the valuation is below a, and
Rn (p; pn) =
Z p+a pn
p
24n 1X
j=0

n 1
j

(1  )n 1 j [F (u  p+ pn)]j
35 f (u) du (30)
=
Z p+a pn
p
[1   + F (u  p+ pn)]n 1 f (u) du
is the number of returning consumers who have sampled all sellers and have not found any
value above a; while seller i is a match that gives the highest valuation. It follows that
Rn (pn; pn) =
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) du: (31)
From the rst-order condition of (28), at an equilibrium with pi = pn for all i = 1; :::; n; the
equilibrium pn satises 0ni  @ni@p jp=pn = 0:
[1  F (a)]'n+
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 dF (u) pnff (a)'n 
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 df (u)g = 0:
(32)
If pn = 0; the LHS of (32) is positive. If pn = a; the LHS of (32) becomes f[1  F (a)]  af (a)g'n;
which is negative because a  1 F (a)f(a) > p1   1 F (p1)f(p1) = 0; where the inequality holds due to
p1 < a and
1 F (a)
f(a) <
1 F (p1)
f(p1)
: Thus there exists some pn 2 (0; a) that solves (32), and pn is
given by
pn =
[1  F (a)]'n +
R a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) du
f (a)'n  
R a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f 0 (u) du : (33)
Lemma 5 below, which is proved in the appendix, states that sellers will charge pn at any
symmetric price equilibrium and provides a su¢ cient condition for the unique existence of
such an equilibrium.24
Lemma 5 At any symmetric price equilibrium of the alternative model, each seller sets pn
according to (33) and consumers search with reservation value a () that satises (26). If
F follows a uniform distribution, then the symmetric price equilibrium exists and is unique.
24Search models generally also have a trivial equilibrium where rms are expected to and indeed charge
very high prices, and no consumer engages in search. As in the literature, we do not consider such trivial
cases.
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We next state a result on how equilibrium price may vary with the average quality of
sellers in the market. The proof is also contained in the appendix.
Proposition 4 In the alternative model where each consumers value is independent for
every match, given the number of sellers (n), an increase in  leads to a decrease in pn.
It may seem surprising that a higher average quality would lead to a lower market price,
but in a search market this result is quite natural, for the following reason. An increase in
the average quality of sellers in the market induces a higher consumer reservation value in
their search decision, because the expected benet from another search is higher. This forces
sellers to lower prices in order to induce consumers to purchase without further search.25
For a given entry cost, when the equilibrium price is given by pn in (33), there exists
a free-entry equilibrium that is similar to the one in the main model, with the marginal
entrants quality, tf ; now dened by (34) below.
Proposition 5 In the alternative model, suppose that the equilibrium price is given by pn
in (33). Then, for any k 2 (0; m) ; there exists an equilibrium for the entire model where:
(i) potential entrant i will enter the market if and only if i  tf , each entrant will charge
pn, and tf satises
NX
n=1
n (tf ) tfpn
1  [1   + F (pn)]n
n
= k; (34)
(ii) consumers will search sequentially with reservation value a that satises (26):
Proof. For a given t and thus ; from (28) and (36), in the symmetric equilibrium with n
sellers the prot for seller i is
ni = pn

i [1  F (a)]
1  [1   + F (a)]n
n [1  F (a)] + i
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) du

= ipn
1  [1   + F (pn)]n
n
:
25Anderson and Renault (1999) study the e¤ect of consumer taste for diversity on equilibrium price in a
search model. They show that, when the preference for diversity is low, equilibrium price may decrease as
the preference for diversity increases due to the increased consumer search.
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Thus, the expected post-entry prot for entrant i is E (ji) =
NX
n=1
n (t)ni; which increases
in i: For the seller with match probability t; its expected prot from entry is
E (jt) =
NX
n=1
n (t) tpn
1  [1   + F (pn)]n
n
;
which is a continuous function of t: Since the marginal entrant with t = 0 has zero prot,
and the marginal entrant with t = 1 has prot m; for any k 2 (0; m) ; E (j0) < k and
E (j1) > k: Therefore, there exists some tf 2 [0; 1) such that E (jtf ) = k: That is, given
k; there exists some tf such that potential entrants with i  tf will enter. Finally, from
Proposition 5, the pricing strategy and consumer search behavior are optimal when there
are n sellers.
Di¤erent from the main model, here we have not proven that tf is an increasing function
of k: The complication is that, as t increases, equilibrium price decreases and thus the
impact on the expected prot of the marginal seller with quality t is unclear.26 For the rest
of this section, we assume that (i) N = 3 and (ii) F and G are both uniform distributions
on [0; 1] :
Then, it can be veried numerically that tf increases in k for various values of s: Fur-
thermore, consumer welfare initially increases but eventually decreases in t: The intuition is
similar as in the main model: a lower tf leads to a higher expected number of sellers in the
market but to a lower sellersaverage quality. The increase in variety benets consumers
by expanding their search opportunities, whereas the decrease in quality harms consumers
by reducing their search e¢ ciency. However, here price is also a¤ected, in two opposing
directions: greater variety acts to reduce equilibrium prices, whereas lower quality works in
the opposite direction as consumers search less due to the lower search benet. Neverthe-
less, as in the main model, when tf is high, and thus the number of active sellers is low, the
variety e¤ect tends to dominate, so that a further increase in tf results in lower consumer
welfare. On the other hand, when tf is low, the quality e¤ect tends to dominate, so that
an increase in tf results in higher consumer welfare. Since tf increases in k; it follows that
26Recall that in the main model, equilibrium price is independent of :
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consumer welfare also rst increases and then decreases in k: Figure 2 below shows how
consumer welfare varies with k for three di¤erent values of search cost:
s = 0:05 (solid curve); s = 0:04 (dashed curve); s = 0:03 (dotted curve)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
k
V
Figure 2
For a given s; let k be the entry cost that maximizes consumer welfare: Then, same as
in the main model (Theorem 1), from the standpoint of consumer welfare entry is excessive
when k  k but decient when k > k: Notice from Figure 2 that for a higher s; k (or
t) is higher, also same as in the main model (Corollay 1). This is because with a higher
search cost, the option to search more varieties is less valuable while the lower quality of
sellers (or lower search e¢ ciency) is more detrimental to consumers.
Consider next total welfare, W: Same as in the main model (Proposition 3), when k  k;
entry is socially excessive, again because of the overentry for consumers and the additional
negative e¤ect on industry prot of the marginal entrant. Furthermore, when k is su¢ ciently
large (but still less than m); entry can be socially decient (as in the main model, too).
For instance, if s = 0:03 and k = 0:2; we can compute that the quality cuto¤ is tf = 0:9
under free entry but to = 0:823 for the social optimum; and the intuition is also similar
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to that in the main model: since k = 0:2 > k ' 0:045; entry is too low from consumers
perspective, and although the marginal entrant has the negative externality on industry
prot, the consumer e¤ect dominates the prot e¤ect when k is large, despite the price
e¤ect of entry in this case.
Therefore, the results of our main model continue to hold in this alternative setting, under
additional functional and parameter restrictions.27
While our most novel result is about the e¤ects of entry on consumer welfare, our nding
about the total welfare e¤ects of entry also di¤ers from those in several closely-related
papers. In particular, Wolinsky (1984) studies the optimality of entry in a circle model
with consumer search. Similar to our main model, entry has no price e¤ect in his model,
where for simplicity he assumes that the price is exogenously given. He reports an overentry
result: the market will o¤er excessive variety from the standpoint of total welfare when
entry cost is su¢ ciently low. This is because in his model the socially optimal variety is
bounded: when the number of varieties is su¢ ciently high (or the entry cost is su¢ ciently
low), consumers will nd a brand satisfying the sequential search stopping rule and not
search further. In this case, an extra entrant will not benet consumers and, consequently,
will reduce total welfare due to the negative externality on other sellersprots.
Our models also predict that entry is socially excessive when the entry cost is su¢ ciently
small, but in our case entry can also be insu¢ cient when the entry cost is relatively large. In
both of our models, overentry in terms of total welfare occurs under low entry costs because
the marginal entrant reduces the average quality of sellers in the market, leading to lower
search e¢ ciency (reenforcing the negative externality on prots); whereas decient entry
can arise under high entry costs because consumers benet from more search opportunities
to nd a match, which can overcome the negative externality on prots.
Our model with horizontal di¤erentiation in this section is more closely related to Ander-
son and Renault (1999), which studies a standard consumer search model with di¤erentiated
products. They nd that market entry is always excessive, because in their model entry is
27We have also studied the case where N = 2, with F and G being standard uniform. The results are
qualitatively the same.
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excessive in the limiting case of zero search cost, and the presence of positive search costs
exacebate the distortion: as search cost rises, equilibrium prices and the number of entrants
increase, while the socially optimal number of rms falls. One may then wonder why in our
model entry can be insu¢ cient or excessive. The key di¤erence is that in our model rms
have di¤erent match probabilities that are all less than 1, whereas in theirs these match
probabilities are the same and equal to 1. The di¤erence in match probabilities (i.e., the
vertical di¤erentiation) in our model creates a search quality e¤ect of entry: the marginal
entrant lowers the expected product quality in the market so that entry can be excessive
for consumers, and excessive entry for total welfare is still more likely due to the marginal
entrants negative e¤ect on industry prot. On the other hand, in our model since the
sellersmatch probabilities are all less than 1, entry also has a positive output expansion
e¤ect (the marginal entrant may be a match for some consumers who would otherwise nd
no match), which explains why there can be underentry in the market equilibrium.
If s = 0, it is now possible that a pure-strategy price equilibrium exists, because the
matched sellers of a consumer are now horizontally di¤erentiated. The equilibrium price
would be higher than in a standard model of product di¤erentiation, because here each seller
also has a captured mass of consumers who have no other match. Entry would still have
a positive variety e¤ect, but would no longer have the negative quality e¤ect, so it would
always benet consumers. For total welfare, however, the consumer benets would need
to be balanced against the negative externality on industry prot, and thus entry could be
socially excessive. If all sellers had the same match probability that also approaches 1, then
the positive variety e¤ect of entry also vanishes, and we would expect entry to be socially
excessive, same as in the limiting case of s = 0 in Anderson and Renault (1999).
We have assumed g () > 0 on [0; 1] ; so that rms always di¤er in match probabilities.
If all rms had the same match probability, then the negative quality externality from
a marginal entrant would disappear, but the positive variety e¤ect remains if the match
probability is less than 1. Since the marginal entrant still has the negative externality on
industry prots, entry may still be either decient or excessive for total welfare. However,
if all rms had the same match probability that also approaches 1, then the positive variety
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e¤ect also vanishes, and we would expect entry to become socially excessive, same as in
Anderson and Renault (1999).
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In parallel to how free entry may lead to social ine¢ ciency when rms possess market
power, this paper has shown that unfettered entry can be detrimental to consumers when
they have imperfect information about sellersquality. If we extend Akerlof (1970)s classic
model of adverse selection by adding consumer search to it, low quality sellers may no longer
drive out high quality ones in fact, a high quality seller will have more incentive to enter
the market. But there is a di¤erent form of market failure: there can be either excessive or
decient entry, for both consumers and the society, because an entrant internalizes neither
the search variety nor the search quality e¤ect that it generates. In contrast to the standard
view in economics, in our model free entry is excessive for consumers when entry cost is
relatively small, and consumer welfare has an inverted-U relationship with entry cost.
To illustrate our idea most transparently, we have abstracted from various market insti-
tutions that respond to the information problem and potentially improve the search variety
vs. quality trade-o¤. For example, rms may engage in costly advertising to convey quality
information to consumers. While advertising cost has often been viewed as a barrier to
competition, it may actually improve search quality and benet consumers by deterring
low quality entrants.28 Also, market intermediaries can simultaneously lower the number
of entrants and raise their average quality. Various accreditation agencies can serve this
purpose, as, for instance, the accreditation of business schools could potentially help appli-
cants search for the right MBA programs. An Internet platform may prominently display
sellers who are more likely to meet consumersneeds, based on either organic search results
or paid placement, as is done by the three largest search engines (Google, Yahoo! and
Microsoft Bing). This can enhance consumer search e¢ ciency, but also raise entry hur-
28For simplicity, we have assumed that consumers have no prior information about the match probability
of a seller. More realistically, consumers may have certain information about the qualities of di¤erent rms
before conducting search, possibly through observing their ads or prices, or through repeat purchases.
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dles for less relevant sellers. Moreover, the organization of rms may also be motivated by
such considerations. For instance, a hotel chain under a brand name may impose certain
quality standards on its member hotels, and a merger between two rms might enable the
merged rm to o¤er products that better meet consumer needs,29 both of which could help
consumer search. To the extent that antirust and regulation can inuence these business
practices, it would be important for policy makers to recognize their benecial roles.
Policies may also impact consumer welfare directly by either facilitating or impeding entry.
However, since it is unlikely that a policy maker will know the precise entry cost or entry
scale that would be optimal for consumers, it is not obvious that government intervention
would improve market outcomes, especially given the institutional arrangements that the
market itself can make, as discussed above. Nevertheless, policies such as a minimum safety
standard or truth-in-advertising regulation will likely improve search e¢ ciency and benet
consumers.
APPENDIX
The Appendix contains proofs for Lemmas 1, 2, 4, 5 and Proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) From (1), for all t 2 [0; 1);
d
dt
=
 tg (t) [1 G (t)] + g (t) R 1t xg (x) dx
[1 G (t)]2 =
g (t)
1 G (t) (   t) > 0:
(ii) Since
d (t=)
dt
=
1
2

   td
dt

=
1
2

   g (t) t (   t)
1 G (t)

=
 (t)
2
; (35)
where  (t)    g(t)t( t)1 G(t) ; to prove d(t=(t))dt > 0; it su¢ ces to show  (t) > 0 for all t 2 [0; 1):
Notice that  (0) =  > 0: Also, since
lim
t!1
d
dt
= lim
t!1
g (t) (   t)
1 G (t) = g (1) limt!1
(   t)
1 G (t) = g (1)
limt!1 ddt   1
  limt!1 g (t) = 1  limt!1
d
dt
;
29Moraga-González and Petrikaite (2013) point out that mergers can benet consumers by reducing con-
sumer search costs, when products from the merging rms are sold in one store after the merger. This
demand-side economies of mergers, arising from the reduction of consumer search costs, di¤er from the
supply-sidebenet of mergers through the increase of product quality.
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we have limt!1 ddt =
1
2 : It follows that
lim
t!1
 (t) = 1  g (1) limt!1
d
dt   1
 g (1) =
1
2
:
Now, suppose to the contrary that  (t)  0 for some t 2 (0; 1) : Then there must exist at
least one t^ 2 (0; 1) such that   t^ = 0 and 0  t^ > 0: Our proof will be complete if we can
show that this leads to a contradiction.
Rewrite  (t) = (   t)
h

 t   t g(t)1 G(t)
i
; then
0 (t) =

d
dt
  1


   t   t
g (t)
1 G (t)

+ (   t)
264 12 (t)
1  t
2   d

tg(t)
1 G(t)

dt
375 :
But for any t^ 2 (0; 1) such that   t^ = 0;  
 t^   t^
g(t^)
1 G(t^)

= 0; and thus
0
 
t^

=      t^  t^ d

tg(t)
1 G(t)

dt

t=t^
 0
because d

g(t)
1 G(t)

=dt  0 by the log-concavity of 1 G. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we show that
lX
n=1
n (t) increases in t for l = 1; 2; :::; N:
Integrating by parts, we have
(N   1)!
(N   1  l)! (l   1)!
Z G(t)
0

N 1 l

(1  )l 1 d
=
(N   1)!
(N   l)! (l   1)!
Z G
0
(1  )l 1 d

N l

=
(N   1)!
(N   l)! (l   1)! (1 G)
l 1GN l +
(N   1)!
(N   l)! (l   2)!
Z G
0
N l (1  )l 2 d:
Repeatedly performing integration by parts for
R G
0 
N l (1  )l 2 d; R G0 N l+1 (1  )l 3 d;
and so on, we obtain:
(N   1)!
(N   1  l)! (l   1)!
Z G(t)
0

N 1 l

(1  )l 1 d
=
lX
n=1
(N   1)!
(n  1)! (N   n)! (1 G (t))
n 1G (t)N n =
lX
n=1
n (t) :
28
Since
R G(t)
0
 
N 1 l

(1  )l 1 d increases in G (t) ; which in turn increases in t;
lX
n=1
n (t)
increases in t:
Then, for any t0 > t; recalling n (t0) > n (t) and n (t) decreases in n; we have
E
 
jt0  E (jt) = NX
n=1
n
 
t0

n
 
t0
  NX
n=1
n (t)n (t) >
NX
n=1

n
 
t0
  n (t)n (t)

NX
n=1

n
 
t0
  n (t)N (t) = " NX
n=1
n
 
t0
  NX
n=1
n (t)
#
N (t) > 0:
Hence, E (jt) increases in t:
Proof of Lemma 3. From (12), consumer surplus when n sellers are active is
Vn =

1  (1  )n



Z 1
pm
(u  pm) f (u) du 

1  (1  )n
2
  n (1  )
n


s  (1  )n ns
=

1  (1  )n

 

Z 1
pm
(u  pm) f (u) du  s

= [1  (1  )n]

  s


;
where we have used the fact that
nX
i=1
xi 1i = 1 x
n
(1 x)2  
nxn
1 x : Hence, from (10), consumer
welfare is
V =

  s

 NX
n=1
 
N
n

[1 G (t)]nG (t)N n  
NX
n=1
 
N
n

[1 G (t)]nG (t)N n (1  )n
!
=
n
1  [1   (1 G (t))]N
o
  s


=
h
1 M (t)N
i
  s


:
Proof of Lemma 4. Given that there are n sellers and each sellers expected match
probability is , the expected industry prot is
nn () = 
m [1  (1  )n] :
Then, from (20) and (11),
 (t) = m
NX
n=0
n (t) [1  (1  )n]  k
NX
n=0
n (t)n
= m
(
1 
NX
n=0
N !
n! (N   n)! [1 G (t)]
nG (t)N n (1  )n
)
  kN [1 G (t)]
= m
h
1 M (t)N
i
  kN [1 G (t)] :
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Moreover, from (9), under free-entry tf satises
k =
tm

NX
n=1

N 1
n 1

[1 G (t)]n 1G (t)N n 1  (1  )
n
n
=
tm

(
NX
n=1
(N   1)!
n! (N   n)! [1 G (t)]
n 1G (t)N n  
NX
n=1
(N   1)!
n! (N   n)! [1 G (t)]
n 1G (t)N n (1  )n
)
=
tm

"
1 G (t)N
N [1 G (t)]  
M (t)N  G (t)N
N [1 G (t)]
#
=
t

m
"
1 M (t)N
N [1 G (t)]
#
:
Therefore, the free-entry equilibrium industry prot is
f =
NX
n=0
n (tf )n [n ()  k] = m
NX
n=1
n (tf ) [1  (1  )n] N [1 G (tf )] k
= m
h
1 M (tf )N
i
  tf

h
1 M (tf )N
i
m
=

1  tf

h
1 M (tf )N
i
m:
Proof of Lemma 5. First, from our argument leading to (33), at any symmetric price
equilibrium of the alternative model, each seller sets pn according to (33) and consumers
search with reservation value a () that satises (26).
Next, we show that pn, dened by (33), is unique, which would be the case if ni (pn; pn)
is a strictly concave function of pn, or
00ni =   [1   + F (pn)]n 1

f (pn) + pnf
0 (pn)
 ff (a)'n Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f 0 (u) dug
is negative. From (29), 'n =
1
n
n 1X
j=0
[1   + F (a)]j  [1   + F (a)]n 1 : Hence
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f 0 (u) du
 [1   + F (a)]n 1
Z a
pn
f 0 (u) du = [1   + F (a)]n 1 [f (a)  f (pn)]  f (a)'n:
Therefore, 00ni < 0 if f (pn) + pnf
0 (pn)  0: When f 0  0; clearly 00ni < 0:
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Finally, we show that ni (p; pn) is strictly concave in p if F follows a uniform distribution,
and hence pn indeed denes a unique symmetric price equilibrium. From (28),
@2ni (p; pn)
@p2
= i

2

 f (p+ a  pn)'n +
@Rn (p; pn)
@p

+ p

 f 0 (p+ a  pn)'n +
@2Rn (p; pn)
@p2

= i

  2f (p+ a  pn) + f 0 (p+ a  pn) p'n + 2@Rn (p; pn)@p + p@2Rn (p; pn)@p2

= i
8<:   [2f (p+ a  pn) + f
0 (p+ a  pn) p]'n
+
R p+a pn
p [1   + F (u  p+ pn)]n 1
h
2f
0
(u) + pf
00
(u)
i
du
9=; ;
where the last equality follows because
@Rn (p; pn)
@p
=
@
R p+a pn
p [1   + F (u  p+ pn)]n 1 f (u) du

@p
=
@
R a
pn
[1   + F (v)]n 1 f (v + p  pn) dv

@p
=
Z a
pn
[1   + F (v)]n 1 f 0 (v + p  pn) dv
=
Z p+a pn
p
[1   + F (u  p+ pn)]n 1 f 0 (u) du
and, similarly,
@R2n (p; pn)
@p2
=
Z p+a pn
p
[1   + F (u  p+ pn)]n 1 f 00 (u) du:
Clearly, if F follows a uniform distribution, then f 0 = 0 and @2ni (p; pn) =@p
2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. From (32), since @@ > 0 and 
00
ni < 0;
dpn
d
=  
@0ni
@ +
@0ni
@a
@
@
00ni
< 0 if
@0ni
@
< 0 and
@0ni
@a
< 0:
First, 0ni in (32) can be rewritten as
0ni = [1  F (a)]'n +
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 dF (u)  pn

f (a)'n  
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 df (u)

= [1  F (a)  pnf (a)]'n +
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) + pnf 0 (u) du:
From (29), 'n =
1
n
n 1X
j=0
[1   + F (a)]j : Hence, @'n@ < 0 and thus
@0ni
@ < 0:
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Second, substituting 'n from (29), we have
[1  F (a)]'n +
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) du
= [1  F (a)] 1  [1   + F (a)]
n
n [1  F (a)] +
1
n
f[1   + F (a)]n   [1   + F (pn)]ng
=
1  [1   + F (pn)]n
n
: (36)
Thus, Letting x  1   + F (a) ; we have
0ni =
1  [1   (1  F (pn))]n
n
 pn

f (a) (1  xn)
n [1  F (a)]   
Z a
pn
[1   (1  F (u))]n 1 df (u)

;

pn
@0ni
@a
= [1   + F (a)]n 1 f (a) f (a)
1  F (a)  
1
n
[1  [1   + F (a)]n]
d

f(a)
1 F (a)

da
+ [1   + F (a)]n 1 f 0 (a)
=
1
n
(
nxn 1
f (a)2 + f 0 (a) [1  F (a)]
1  F (a)  
1  xn
1  F (a)
f 0 (a) [1  F (a)] + f2 (a)
[1  F (a)]
)
=
1
n
f 0 (a) [1  F (a)] + f2 (a)
1  F (a)

nxn 1   1  x
n
1  F (a)

=

n
f 0 (a) [1  F (a)] + f2 (a)
1  F (a)

nxn 1   1  x
n
1  x

< 0 for x 2 (0; 1)
since 1 x
n
1 x =
n 1X
j=0
xj > nxn 1 for x 2 (0; 1) : Hence, @0ni@a < 0:
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